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Abstract
We study the role of costly information in non-cooperative two-player games
when an extrinsic third party information broker is introduced asymmetrically,
allowing one player to obtain information about the other player’s action. This
broker or “oracle” is defined by a probability of response, supplying correct in-
formation randomly; the informed player can pay more for a higher probability of
response. We determine the necessary and sufficient conditions for strategy profiles
to be equilibria, in terms of how both players change their strategies in response
to the existence of the oracle, as determined by its cost of information function.
For mixed strategy equilibria, there is a continuous change as information becomes
cheaper, with clear transitions occuring at critical nodes at which pure strategies
become dominated (or undominated). These nodes separate distinct responses to
the information for sale, alternating between regions where the paying player in-
creases the amount of information purchased, and regions where the other player
moves away from riskier strategies, in favor of safer bets that minimize losses. We
derive conditions for these responses by defining a value of information.
1 Introduction
All decisions are made in the presence of information, and sometimes in spite of its
absence. In the classic theory of simultaneous non-cooperative games, information ap-
pears in two different ways: while players typically have complete and common knowl-
edge of the rules, strategy choices available, and payoffs in the game, they usually have
no information on what actual strategy is about to be played by their opponent. Yet
in the real world, people often look to obtain an edge in competing with adversaries
by looking for any hint as to what the other player will do; such information could
be highly valuable. In fact, there is experimental evidence that human subjects will
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pay to know what strategy is being played against them, even when that information
has no impact on their strategy choice (Eliaz and Schotter, 2010). Subjects will also
sometimes attempt to deceive an opponent about their own intended strategy (McDon-
ald, 1996). Beyond formalized game situations, competitors in business and biology
are often willing to expend time, capital, or valuable energy resources in order to ob-
tain information to potentially tip the scales beyond the uncertainty of strategy choice
(Morris and Shin, 2002; Asahina et al., 2008; Gabaix et al., 2006). The scenario we
consider here for two-player games allows us to define a value of information, and to
study the role it plays among other choices made.
In general, the lack of information in game theory falls into one of two main cat-
egories: incomplete information, where players are uncertain about some of the rules
of the game or the payoffs that will result from outcomes, and imperfect information,
where players lack information about the current state of the game, such as decisions
made by other players or random events that have occurred in secret. Under certain
assumptions a game with incomplete information will be equivalent to a Bayesian game
with complete but imperfect information (Harsanyi, 1967). However, generally the two
types of information and their motivations from real world scenarios remain distinct.
In games of incomplete information, the role of information and the willingness of
players to purchase it has been studied in a number of contexts, such as Beauty Contest
games (Myatt and Wallace, 2012; Hellwig and Veldkamp, 2009; Rigos, 2018), election
models (Martinelli, 2007), Cournot games (Myatt and Wallace, 2015), the Battle of
the Sexes (Hu et al., 2018), and investment games in the presence of noisy signals
determined by some underlying state (Yang, 2015; Szkup and Trevino, 2015).
Here we focus on games with imperfect information, where one player has the
ability to acquire information about the second player’s strategy. Classic game theory
considering one-shot simultaneous games has complete but imperfect information, since
neither player knows the strategy of the other player until they have both played out
their choices. The value given to advance information on an opponents choice will
clearly depend of the arrangement of payoffs and strategies in the game. In treating
this situation, it is necessary to consider both the actions of the first player in acquiring
this information and responding to it, as well as the second player’s actions taking into
account the possibility of their strategy being revealed. Many studies have investigated
these issues, for instance iterated games with information about past strategy choices
restricted by some cost (Ben-Porath and Kahneman, 2003; Flesch and Perea, 2009;
Miklo´s-Thal and Schumacher, 2013). Other studies include the difference between
Cournot or Betrand duopoly games and Stackelberg games in terms of information
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sharing (Ruiz-Herna´ndez et al., 2017; Sakai, 1986), games with random information
leaked revealing possible changes in strategy (Halpern and Pass, 2018), and iterated
Prisoner’s Dilemma with network effects (Antonioni et al., 2014). Solan and Yariv
(2004) study a modification to two-player games in which one player can purchase a
noisy signal correlated with the opponent’s action, but has some probability of signalling
a different action and misleading the player. Higher payments increase the reliability
of the signal, depending on the cost function associated with the signalling device.
We introduce a formalism into standard two player games for the purchase of infor-
mation about the realization of strategy choices, and study its effect on pure and mixed
strategy equilibria. We do not treat the theoretical issues surrounding the meaning of
mixed strategy equilibria in games (see e.g. Reny and Robson (2004)), focusing instead
of the implementation of such equilibria in individual one-shot games (see for instance
the analysis of soccer penalty kicks by Chiappori et al. (2002)). In a given game, after
a player has chosen to play a pure or mixed strategy, the latter choice will involve a
second step in which an independent process is required to select at random one of the
pure strategies to be played, according to the probabilities of the strategy. It is the
information about this final selection that we are concerned with here.
We replace the standard approach to partial information, in which players pay
for the increased accuracy of noisy signals, with a partial response approach in which
completely accurate information is purchased but not always received. Thus any in-
formation supplied is always correct, while when information is not supplied, that too
is well known to the purchaser. The process is intrinsically asymmetric: only one of
the players can pay for the probability of learning the particular strategy which will be
realized on the other player’s side. This other player, meanwhile, knows only that this
information may be revealed, and adjusts accordingly.
This paper is organized as follows. We first define an extrinsic third player into a
classic two player game: an “oracle” who can be paid for a chance to reveal information
about one of the players to the other. After exploring the consequences of such an oracle
in representative examples, we define the properties of these games, and prove results
on how any mixed Nash equilibria will be modified by the cost function of the oracle.
We also discuss the apparent impossibility of including a second, symmetric oracle, and
discuss further directions for the development of these ideas.
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2 Preliminary Considerations
We begin by considering a standard normal form game G with exactly one mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium; as we will show later, the modifications we propose here do
not affect the pure strategy Nash equilibria, so games with only pure strategy equilibria
will be unchanged. We briefly discuss games with multiple mixed equilibria in Section
6.
We define an oracle to be an external agent to G who knows and can potentially
reveal information about each player’s actual choice of strategy, before these choices
are “played” and payoffs resolve. The oracle is defined to have an associated “oracle
function” I(x) which determines its probability of response as a function of the amount
it is paid. When paid x, the oracle either reveals completely accurate information
about a player’s strategy choice with probability I(x), or remains silent and gives no
information with probability 1−I(x). In this way, the oracle allows for partial purchase
of information about a player’s choice without introducing anything other than factual
information (i.e. the oracle either tells the truth or says nothing).
In principle, I: [0,+∞) → [0, 1], however the domain of I may be effectively
bounded due to a rational player not paying beyond some fixed amount xm, deter-
mined for instance by the largest variation in payoffs in the game, xm < Pmax − Pmin.
Note also that x = 0 is included, which represents not paying the oracle at all.
2.1 Motivating Example 1
To illustrate our approach, we first consider the following two-player normal form game
1 2 B1 B2
A1 1,−1 0, 0
A2 0, 0 2,−2
which is a matching pennies (anticoordination) game with scaled payoffs. This game
has only one Nash equilibrium, for which A and B each play the mixed strategy (23 ,
1
3).
Since every simultaneous game is equivalent to a sequential game in which neither
player observes the actions taken by the other (see e.g. (Gonza´lez-Daz et al., 2010)),
we first consider this as a sequential game in which player B selects a strategy first,
as illustrated in Fig 1. The mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of this game gives a
probability over these pure strategies shown in the tree, while in any actual realization
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A1 A2
B1
A1 A2
B2
B
AA
(1,−1) (0, 0) (0, 0) (2,−2)
Figure 1: Matching Pennies Extensive form game
of this game, the players will randomly play one of these strategies determined by a
random process.
We next introduce an oracle, a third player who has access to the realized pure
strategy which will actually be played by player B. We modify the game by inserting
three additional stages into the standard sequence as follows:
1. Player A chooses a nonnegative amount x to pay to the oracle.
2. Player B chooses a strategy.
3. With probability I(x) the oracle informs player A of player B’s realized pure
strategy (respond), and with probability 1− I(x) remains silent (silent).
4. Player A then chooses a strategy and the game resolves, with player A’s final
payoff being decreased by the payment x chosen earlier.
Fig 2 shows the extensive form of this game. Note that since no information is given
to player B at any point, the order of stages 1-3 may be rearranged in several ways,
which allows for easier analysis without affecting the game.
First note that in this example, player A’s best response to each of player B’s
strategies is unique (we will restrict ourselves to games with this property for the
remainder of the paper). Therefore, in the case that the oracle responds and provides
B’s strategy, the rational response of player A is already determined. Thus player A
only makes two choices: the amount x of payment to the oracle, and the strategy choice
when the oracle does not respond. Thus we may equivalently consider a sequence in
which A makes a tentative decision of what to play at the beginning of the game, and
changes her mind only if the oracle responds:
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A1 A2
respond
A1 A2
silent
B1
A1 A2
respond
A1 A2
silent
B2
x
A
B
Oracle
A
1 0 1 0 0 2 0 2
Figure 2: Game tree illustrating the initial inclusion of an oracle providing information
to player A.
1. Player A chooses any nonnegative amount x to pay to the oracle.
2. With probability I(x) the oracle commits to informing player A of B’s strategy
at a later time, and with probability 1− I(x) commits to remaining silent.
3. Player A tentatively chooses a strategy to play if not given a response.
4. Player B chooses a strategy to play.
5. If the oracle committed to respond, it does so now, Player A ignores his previous
choice and chooses the best response to player B’s strategy. If the oracle commit-
ted to remaining silent, then player A uses the tentative choice. In either case,
the game resolves and player A’s payoff is reduced by x.
Fig 3 shows the extensive game for this version. We model the subgame at stage
2 as a Bayesian game with two possible states (Gonza´lez-Daz et al., 2010). When the
oracle does not respond, the payoff matrix for the Oracle Game is the same as the
game without an oracle. When the oracle does respond, the payoffs for each player are
given by player A’s best response in the column determined by player B’s choice (since
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B1 B2
A1
B1 B2
A2
respond
B1 B2
A1
B1 B2
A2
silent
x
A
Oracle
A(tentative)
B
1 2 1 2 1 0 0 2
Figure 3: Standard game tree construction for an Oracle Game.
x is constant in this subgame, we omit it in the payoff matrices as it does not affect
equilibria). This is represented as the matrix R:
1 2 B1 B2
A1 1,−1 2,−2
A2 1,−1 2,−2
where A1 and A2 are the tentative decisions for player A. We refer to R as the maximal
matrix of the game, since the payoffs for player A are equal to the maximum in each
column of the original payoff matrix. Since this matrix shows the payoffs when the
oracle does respond, it is natural that the payoffs in each column are identical since he
changes his mind and ignores his previous decision. If M is the original payoff matrix,
then the matrix of the expected values that the players perceive in the subgame is given
by M · (1− I(x)) +R · I(x). In this example, it becomes:
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1 2 B1 B2
A1 1,−1 2I(x),−2I(x)
A2 I(x),−I(x) 2,−2
The equilibria of this game will depend on the value of the oracle function I(x),
which will depend on the value x paid by Player A. The strategy space may be described
as S = {sa, sb, x} where sb is B’s strategy, sa is A’s tentative strategy, and x is A’s
payment to the oracle. To simplify notation, we will often use I to denote I(x), and
likewise I ′ denotes dIdx , understood to be evaluated at the value of x being played by A.
One of our main results for these oracle games are that transitions occur at critical
values of the purchased probability I(x). For any a, b ∈ R we define xa to be the
smallest payment x such that I(x) = a, and yb to be any x such that I
′(x) = b. 1 For
the game considered in this example, we classify the equilibria into one of three cases,
depending only on properties of the oracle function I(x):
Case 1: If I ′(0) ≤ 32 , the equilibrium is {(23 , 13), (23 , 13), 0}, since player A pays x = 0,
the players behave as they would if there was no oracle.
Case 2: If I ′(0) ≥ 32 ≥ I ′(x 12 ), the equilibrium is {(
2−I
3(1−I) ,
1−2I
3(1−I)), (
2
3 ,
1
3), y 32
}.
Case 3: If I ′(x 1
2
) ≥ 32 , the equilibrium is {(1, 0), (2I
′−1
2I′ ,
1
2I′ ), x 12
}.
The determination of these equilibria follows from Theorem 1, presented below in
Section 4. Figure 4 illustrates oracle functions leading to each of these cases for this
example. Note that all I(x) are appropriately capped at I = 1, as it is a probability.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 4: Equilibrium payments (black dot) for the game in Example 1, shown for
oracle functions (a) I(x) =
√
x+ 1− 1; (b) I(x) = √x; (c) I(x) = 2√x.
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2.2 Motivating Example 2
We next consider a 3× 3 symmetric game, defined by the matrix:
1 2 B1 B2 B3
A1 1,−1 0, 0 0, 0
A2 0, 0 2,−2 0, 0
A3 0, 0 0, 0 4,−4
Note that this matrix contains the previous example as a submatrix. With no oracle,
the only equilibrium is when A and B both play the mixed strategy (47 ,
2
7 ,
1
7). If Player A
is given access to an oracle, then using the same process as before, the matrix becomes:
1 2 B1 B2 B3
A1 1,−1 2I,−2I 4I,−4I
A2 I,−I 2,−2 4I,−4I
A3 I,−I 2I,−2I 4,−4
For this game, the equilibria fall into one of the following cases:
Case 1: If I ′(0) ≤ 78 the equilibrium is {(47 , 27 , 17), (47 , 27 , 17), 0}.
Case 2: If I ′(0) ≥ 78 ≥ I ′(x 15 ), the equilibrium is{(
4 + I
7(1− I) ,
2− 3I
7(1− I) ,
1− 5I
7(1− I)
)
,
(
4
7
,
2
7
,
1
7
)
, y 7
8
}
At I = 15 , the probability of A3 reaches 0, where A can no longer maintain B’s
indifference since B3 is now weakly dominated by a mixed strategy of B1 and B2.
Case 3: If 78 ≤ I ′(x 15 ) ≤
3
2 , the equilibrium is{(
3
4
,
1
4
, 0
)
,
(
8I ′ − 2
10I ′
,
4I ′ − 1
10I ′
,
3− 2I ′
10I ′
)
, x 1
5
}
At I ′ = 32 , the probability of B3 reaches 0, and B can no longer prevent A from
increasing x.
9
xe
2 3 4 5
I(xe)
Figure 5: Equilibrium amount xe paid to the oracle by player A (top) for the game in
Example 2, and the resulting response rate I(xe) (bottom) as functions of the parameter
k for the oracle response probability function I(x) =
√
kx.
At this point, A and B have both eliminated strategy 3 (B will never play it as it
is now a dominated strategy, and A will never play it since after eliminating column 3
it is also dominated). Thus the game reduces to the matrix:
1 2 B1 B2
A1 1,−1 2I,−2I
A2 I,−I 2,−2
Note that this is identical to the matrix from the first game, thus, all equilibria that
come from this matrix will be identical.
Case 4: If I ′(x 1
5
) ≥ 32 ≥ I ′(x 12 ), the equilibrium is{(
2− I
3(1− I) ,
1− 2I
3(1− I) , 0
)
,
(
2
3
,
1
3
, 0
)
, y 3
2
}
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Case 5: If I ′(x 1
2
) ≥ 32 , the equilibrium is{
(1, 0, 0) ,
(
2I ′ − 1
2I ′
,
1
2I ′
, 0
)
, x 1
2
}
In general, if G is a game, and H is a game which contains G as a subgame, then if
I(x) is an oracle function that causes all strategies in H which are not in G to become
dominated, then the equilibria of games G and H subject to oracle I will be the same.
To illustrate how the amount paid by Player A at equilibrium xe varies as the
cost of information decreases in this example, we consider a one parameter family of
oracle functions I(x) =
√
kx with parameter k; the cost of information decreases as k
increases. Figure 5 shows the dependent of The dependence of xe on k, as well as the
changes in the purchased probability of response I(xe).
The numbers between the dotted lines indicate which case the equilibrium corre-
sponds to in that interval; note that case 1 does not occur for any k since
√
kx has
infinite slope at x = 0. For Cases 2 and 4, Player A gradually increases x in response to
the cheaper information, while maintaining B’s indifference by adjusting sa to compen-
sate. In cases 3 and 5, A maintains I at a constant value (which costs less to maintain
as information becomes cheaper), and B maintains A’s indifference by adjusting sb
away from exploitable strategies.
In the following sections we prove results about Oracle Games indicating that most
well-behaved games have equilibria similar to these example cases (for certain notions
of “well-behaved” and “similar”), and we show how these equilibria are determined.
2.3 General Definitions for Oracle Games
Let G be a simultaneous, two-player game with the m×n payoff matrix M and players
A and B. Let G|I be the game where A and B play game G but A is given access to an
oracle with function I(x). If A’s maximal payoff in each column of M is unique, then
A’s best response to an oracle response is predetermined, which means that A does not
have to specify a strategy choice when the oracle responds. The set of strategy profiles
is then expressed as S = {sa, sb, x} where sb is B’s strategy, sa is A’s strategy when the
oracle does not respond, and x is A’s payment to the oracle. We make no meaningful
distinction between pure and mixed strategies, except to note that an assumption we
make later allows all oracle payments x to be considered as pure strategies.
For each j, let αj be the index of the row corresponding to the highest payoff to
A in column j of M (we assume this is unique for each j). We define the maximal
matrix R by Ri,j = Mαj ,j , such that every outcome in R is a copy of the outcome in
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M corresponding to A’s best response to strategy j. Let C be the m×n matrix where
the payoff to A is 1 and the payoff to B is 0 in every cell. Then for every x ∈ [0,∞),
A paying the oracle x induces a Bayesian game with expected payoffs
M · (1− I(x)) +R · I(x)− C · x.
Let MI(x) := M · (1 − I(x)) + R · I(x). Since the equilibria of a payoff matrix do not
change with a constant reduction in all of the payoffs for either player, for each fixed x
this will have the same equilibria as the actual induced payoff matrix.
Then s ∈ S is a Nash equilibrium if and only if A and B are both indifferent on
changing each of their strategies. Thus a necessary condition for an equilibrium must
be that for whichever x player A is paying, sa, sb must be an equilibrium for the matrix
MI(x), since otherwise A or B could profit by changing their strategies. We also write
the expected payoff Ea of A playing G|I in terms of A’s expected payoff Er from G|I
given a response and the expected payoff En given no response, as
Ea(sa, sb, x) = En(sa, sb) · (1− I) + Er(sb) · I − x.
Definition 1. We define the Value of Information V to be the marginal increase in
Player A’s expected payoff with increasing probability of response I, that is
V :=
∂Ea
∂I
= Er − En.
Thus the value of information is the change in expected benefit for A due to receiving
“more response”, i.e. a greater chance of correct response. If we assume that player
A always chooses the optimal sa for the particular cross section MI(x), then V can be
expressed solely as a function of sb. It immediately follows that V ≥ 0 for all sa, sb,
since A’s payoff when the oracle responds is always at least as good as her payoff when
it is silent.
Remarks:
1) whenever sb is a pure strategy, A will play the best response to sb, regardless of
whether the oracle responds or not. Thus Er = En, and V = 0, which makes sense in
this case where the information has no value.
2) Ea is linear with respect to sb: if s1 and s2 are strategies for B, and p ∈ [0, 1],
then Ea(sa, ps1 + (1− p)s2, x) = pEa(sa, s1, x) + (1− p)Ea(sa, s2, x). This also implies
V is linear with respect to sb.
Definition 2. We say that G|I has a node at c if one of B’s strategies changes from
dominated to undominated (or vice versa) in MI(x) at x = c.
Such nodes are represented at equilibrium for Example 2 by the dashed lines in Fig. 5.
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3 Fundamental Properties of Oracle Games
We first derive some fundamental results that elucidate the basic properties of these
Oracle Games.
Proposition 1. If {sa, sb} is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of G, then {sa, sb, 0} is
a Nash equilibrium of G|I.
Proof: If {sa, sb} is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in G, then sa is a best
response to sb, and sb is a best response to sa in M , and if x = 0 then the oracle never
responds, so MI(0) = M . And since B is playing a pure strategy, sa will be a best
response to sb regardless of whether the oracle responds or not, so A cannot benefit by
increasing x. Thus, no player has an incentive to change their strategies in any way,
and {sa, sb, 0} is a Nash equilibrium of G|I. 
In other words, the oracle does not affect pure strategy equilibria. This is natural,
since in a pure strategy equilibria, both players are playing pure strategies, so informa-
tion confirming what is already known adds no value.
Definition 3. We define two oracle functions I(x) and J(x) to be equivalent (I ∼= J)
if for every game G, the set of equilibrium strategies (excluding the oracle payment)
and resulting expected payoffs (including the payment) are identical for G|I and G|J .
This definition is useful because of the following results, which are based on the fact
that a rational player will never pay more for less information (or in our case, for a less
probable response).
Proposition 2. Every oracle function is equivalent to one which is continuous, non-
decreasing, and (weakly) concave down.
Proof: Given any oracle function I(x), we will construct another oracle function
J(x) based on I such that J is continuous, nondecreasing and (weakly) concave down,
and then show that J is equivalent to I.
We first construct a nondecreasing version of I. Suppose that there exists some
c2 > c1 such that I(c2) < I(c1); player A will never pay c2 since it’s dominated by c1
(choosing c2 over c1 means paying more for less information). The value of information
is always nonnegative, therefore A’s expected value must be nondecreasing with respect
to I, and strictly decreasing with respect to x. If we let J1 be an oracle function with
J1(x) = sup(I(a) : a ≤ x)
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then J1 is nondecreasing since it’s taking the supremum over a growing set. And J1
is equivalent to I because any values of x that differ between I and J1 are ones for
which I has dropped below sup(I), which are also x that A would never pay. Similarly
in G|J1, A will also never pay them because that would be paying more for the same
amount of information.
The fact that Player A can play a mixed strategy between two oracle payments
leads to the second result, which we show by constructing a non-concave up version
of J1. Let c1 and c2 be any numbers in [0,∞), and A’s mixed strategy be to pay c1
with probability p and c2 with probability (1 − p). The expected amount A will pay
is then pc1 + (1 − p)c2 = x¯, and the expected probability that the oracle will respond
will be pI(c1) + (1− p)I(c2) = I¯. The combination of these two yields the same results
as another oracle function which took on the value I¯ at the point x¯. Thus the oracle
function J1 is equivalent to the supremum of its convex hull:
J(x) = sup(pJ1(c1) + (1− p)J1(c2))
where the supremum is over all c1 and c2 in [0,∞) and all p in [0, 1]. The supremum
of the convex hull of any function is automatically continuous and (weakly) concave
down. Note also that J is nondecreasing because J1 is. 
In Figure 6 we show an example of this construction process for a particular I(x)
(Fig. 6a), with equivalent nondecreasing oracle functions J1(x) (Fig. 6b), and the full
simplification of the proposition, Fig. 6c. We next show that any G|I with a nonzero
cost of zero information can be shifted to an equivalent game for which I(0) = 0.
Proposition 3. Suppose G|I is a game with payoff matrix M and oracle function I(x)
with I(0) > 0. Then there exist a game H and oracle function J(x) with J(0) = 0 such
that G|I ∼= H|J .
For G|I, let I(0) = c > 0, and note that c ≤ 1. Define the following
N = MI(0) = (1− c)M + cR, J(x) =
I(x)− c
1− c
First note that the maximal matrix R is the same for M and N , since the highest
payoff to A in each column of MI is the same for all values of I. Also, J(x) will be
continuous, nondecreasing, and concave down if I(x) is, and J(0) = 0 since I(0) = c.
Additionally, J(x) will reach 1 at the same x value that I(x) does.
Then for any x, NJ(x) = (1− J(x))N + J(x)R
= (1− I(x)−c1−c )((1− c)M + cR) + I(x)−c1−c R
= (1− c)M − (I(x)− c)M + cR− cR I(x)−c1−c +R I(x)−c1−c
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IJ1
J
x
Figure 6: Illustration of the equivalence proven in Proposition 2 (see text): the original
oracle function I(x) (top); a nondecreasing but equivalent oracle function J1(x) (mid-
dle); the final nondecreasing and weakly concave down oracle function J(x) (bottom).
= (1− I(x))M + cR+ (I(x)− c)R
= (1− I(x))M + I(x)R
Which is MI(x) by definition. 
Therefore it is sufficient to only consider oracle functions with I(0) = 0. For the
remainder of this paper, we assume without loss of generality that all oracle functions
are continuous, nondecreasing, (weakly) concave down, and satisfy I(0) = 0.
4 Main Results
We first show the conditions under which an equilibrium exists for an Oracle Game,
followed by the conditions for a rational strategy to become dominated when enough
information has been purchased. We then find the conditions and properties of the
transitions occuring in these games as strategies become dominated or undominated.
Theorem 1. If I(x) is differentiable at c in the interior of its domain, then {sa, sb, c}
is an equilibrium of G|I if and only if
1. {sa, sb} is an equilibrium of MI(c)
2. V (sb) · I ′(c) = 1
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Proof: Condition 1 holds if and only if player A or B have no incentive to change
sa or sb respectively. If we express player A’s payoff as Ea(sa, sb, I(x)) − x, then it
suffices to find a global maximum of this function on its domain. Taking the derivative
with respect to x and setting equal to zero yields
∂Ea
∂I
dI
dx
− 1 = 0
assuming that sb is constant. Since V = ∂Ea/∂I by definition, this is equivalent to
condition 2, and shows that it yields a local maximum. V ≥ 0 and I is (weakly) concave
down imply that Ea(sa, sb, I(x)) − x is also concave down with respect to x, so any
local maximum must be a global maximum. 
Lemma 1. 1. If {sa, sb} is an equilibrium of MI(0) and limx→0+ I ′(x) ≤ 1V (sb) then
{sa, sb, 0} will be an equilibrium of G|I.
2. If {sa, sb} is an equilibrium of MI(x1) and limx→x−1 I
′(x) ≥ 1V (sb) then {sa, sb, x1}
will be an equilibrium of G|I.
Proof: Although I(x) will not be differentiable at the endpoints, (i.e. at 0 and x1
since player A cannot choose values of x < 0 and gains no benefit beyond I(x) = 1), we
only need to look at the one sided limit in these cases. If limx→0+ I ′(x) ≤ 1V (sb) , then
player A will gain less benefit from increasing the oracle payment than the increase in
cost, and has no incentive to do so. Similarly, if limx→x−1 I
′(x) ≥ 1V (sb) , then player A
will lose more benefit from decreasing the oracle payment than the reduction in cost,
(and can gain no more benefit from increasing the cost, since I is capped at 1), so has
no incentive to change it. 
We also note that, even if I ′(x) has discontinuities, condition 2 of Theorem 1 can be
modified to say that c must equal the supremum over all points with V (sb) · I ′(x) ≤ 1.
For the remainder of the paper, we assume M is a payoff matrix such that MI(x)
has a unique Nash equilibrium for each x, except possibly at nodes. Then we can define
sa(x) and sb(x) as the strategies sa and sb in the unique equilibrium of MI(x) for all x
except at nodes. If x is a node and all equilibria at that node have the same sa or sb,
then sa(x) or sb(x) are defined as the appropriate strategy, while if sa or sb vary across
equilibria, then the corresponding function is undefined at that node (in most games
we consider, sa(x) will be defined at nodes and sb(x) will not).
We also add the assumption that I is strictly increasing and strictly concave down.
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Proposition 4. If strategy s for player B is not dominated in M (weakly or strongly),
but is dominated in MI(w) for some w, then it is strictly dominated for all MI(x) with
x > w. That is, a strategy which becomes dominated as x increases remains dominated
with further increase of x.
Proof: First consider the case when s becomes dominated by some pure strategy
p. Let rj be the payoffs to B for strategy j in the matrix R (A’s best strategies when
the oracle responds). Let bi,j be the entry in M in the ith row and jth column for B’s
payoff, then the entry in the ith row and jth column of MI(x) will be
ci,j,x = (1− I(x))bi,j + I(x)rj .
Define mi,j = rj − bi,j , then ci,j,x = bi,j + I(x)mi,j . That is, the entries in the matrix
will scale linearly with I, going from bi,j when I = 0 and reaching rj when I = 1. Thus
if strategy s is not dominated by p when x = 0 (and I(0) = 0), this means there must
be a row k such that bk,j ≥ bk,p. But if it is then dominated by p for some nonzero
payment w, this means that bk,s + mk,sI(w) ≤ bk,p + mk,pI(w). Together these imply
that mk,p > mk,s and thus rp > rs.
Then for any row i, s dominated by p at w implies bi,s+mi,sI(w) ≤ bi,p+mi,pI(w).
Case 1: bi,s > bi,p. Using the same argument as above, we have mk,p > mk,s. Then
each of bi,s +mi,sI(w) and bi,p +mi,p · I(w) can be viewed as linear function dependent
on I, with slope m. Then if line p has a greater slope and is above line s at I(w), then
for any x > w, it will also be greater at I(x) since I is an increasing function.
Case 2: bi,s ≤ bi,p Going back to ci,j,x = (1 − I(x))bi,j + I(x)rj , that is, for every
x, the elements ci,j,x are weighted averages of bi,j and rj . Then since bi,s ≤ bi,p and
rs < r0, then
(1− I(x))bi,s + I(x)rs < (1− I(x))bi,p + I(x)rp
for all values of x.
For any mixed strategy p, we can consider a hypothetical pure strategy whose
payoffs are the weighted averages of the payoffs of its components (proportional to
the probability that they are played). If we let rp be the weighted average of the rj
weighted by the frequencies of strategy j in p (instead of simply the best payoff to A
in the hypothetical strategy), then the same analysis as above shows that if strategy s
becomes dominated by p at some w, it will stay dominated by p for all x > w. 
Note that if a strategy starts out dominated at x = 0, Proposition 4 does not apply.
However, if such a strategy becomes undominated at some x > 0, and then be redomi-
nated by another strategy at a greater x, Proposition 4 would apply, and that strategy
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would remain dominated. Thus each strategy corresponds to at most two nodes, and
if G|I has finitely many strategies implies, it has finitely many nodes.
Proposition 5. In each interval between two nodes, and for each strategy i in the
support of sa(x), there exist ai, bi, ci ∈ R such that the probabilities of playing strategy
i in sa(x) can be expressed as
ai+biI
ci(1−I) for all x in the interval.
Proof: Let M be the payoff matrix. Recall that the cross section matrix MI(x) has
payoffs to B, (1−I)bi,j +Irj where bi,j are the payoffs to B in M, and rj are the payoffs
to B corresponding A’s best response in column j. Suppose sa(x) = (A1, A2, ...Am) is
a mixed strategy of Player A. Then for each j, player B’s expected value when playing
strategy j is
Ej =
n∑
i=1
Ai[(1− I)bi,j + Irj ]
If we fix a particular interval between two nodes, then the set of B’s pure strategies
which are undominated is constant on that interval. Let n be the number of undom-
inated pure strategies for B in that interval. Note that the condition that MI(x) has
unique equilibria between nodes implies that A also has n undominated pure strate-
gies. Fix k as the index of one of B’s undominated pure strategies. Then sa(x) can be
expressed as the solutions to the simultaneous equations Ek = Ej for all j 6= 1, and∑n
i=1Ai = 1.
Using the last condition, we obtain
Am = 1−
n−1∑
i=1
Ai
which when substituted into the Ej gives
Ej =
n−1∑
i=1
Ai[(1− I)bi,j + Irj ] + (1−
n−1∑
i=1
Ai)[(1− I)bn,j + Irj ]
= (1− I)bn,j + Irj +
n−1∑
i=1
Ai(1− I)(bi,j − bn,j)
Since every instance of Ai is multiplied by 1− I, we define ui = (1− I)Ai to get
Ej = (1− I)bn,j + Irj +
n−1∑
i=1
ui(bi,j − bn,j)
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Then we have n−1 simultaneous equations with n−1 variables ui, with the coefficients
on all ui in R, and the constant terms have I with degree at most 1. It follows that the
solutions must be of the form ui = a + bI for some ai, bi ∈ R. Thus all Ai are of the
form ai+biI(1−I) for some ai, bi in R. This suffices to prove the proposition. Additionally, if
we have all bi,j ∈ Q, then ai, bi ∈ Q, and by using the least common denominator of ai
and bi we can express this as
Ai =
ai + biI
ci(1− I)
with ai, bi, ci ∈ Z 
Note that this implies that sa(x) is continuous between nodes. Additionally, the
support of sa(x) must be constant between nodes because the support of sb(x) is.
Proposition 6. The equilibrium strategy of Player B sb(x) is piecewise constant with
respect to x, with discontinuities only at the nodes.
Proof: Suppose {sa(c), sb(c)} is an equilibrium of MI(c) for some particular c ∈ R.
Thus sb(c) causes player A to be indifferent among all strategies included in sa(c). But
since sa(c) is player A’s strategy when the oracle does not respond, her indifference
does not depend on I. So sb(c) causes A to be indifferent on the support of sa(x) in
MI(x) for all x. Additionally sa(c) causes player B to be indifferent on the support of
sb(c) in MI(c).
Let d be any value such that there are no nodes between c and d. This means a
strategy is dominated for B in MI(c) if and only if it is dominated in MI(d). sb(c) is part
of an equilibrium in MI(c), so none of the strategies in its support are dominated. Thus
they are also undominated in MI(d), so there must be some s
′
a which causes player B to
be indifferent on the support of sb(c) in MI(d). Proposition 5 implies that the support
of s′a is the same as the support of sa(c) since the formulas that define each strategy’s
probability are nonzero between nodes. Then B must play a strategy that causes A to
be indifferent on all strategies in this support. sb(c) accomplishes this, thus (s
′
a, sb(c))
is an equilibrium in MI(d). And by assumption the equilibrium is unique at each point,
so sb(c) = sb(d) 
Since we have expressed the equilibrium strategies sa(x) and sb(x) as functions of
x, we can also express the expected payoff of player A as
Ea(x) = Er(x) · I(x) + En(x) · (1− I(x))− x.
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where Er(x) is player A’s expected payoff when sa(x) and sb(x) are played with the
payoff matrix R (the oracle responds) and En(x) is A’s expected payoff when sa(x)
and sb(x) are played with the payoff matrix M (the oracle does not respond). Then
the value of information V = ∂Ea∂I , which we showed earlier depends only on sb, can
also be expressed as a function of x:
V (x) = Er(sb(x))− En(sb(x)).
It the follows immediately that V (x) is piecewise constant with discontinuities only at
the nodes, which comes from its direct dependence on sb(x).
If we consider a simplified construction where a player has the binary option to
purchase information or not for a fixed cost c, this corresponds to a stepwise oracle
function I(x). But by proposition 2, this is equivalent to an Oracle Game with a
linear oracle function with slope 1/c. This, together with V (x) piecewise constant and
Theorem 1, means equilibria will only occur at nodes (except when c = 1/V , in which
case there are infinitely many equilibria)
The following Lemma is a stronger version of Proposition 4 for strictly competetive
games, as it eliminates the possibility of strategies dominated at x = 0 which become
undominated for x > 0. Thus, the only nodes that can occur are ones corresponding
to strategies becoming dominated.
Lemma 2. If G is strictly competitive, then any strategy for player B which is domi-
nated in M will be dominated in MI(x) for all x.
Proof: Suppose that strategy d dominates strategy k for player B in M . Let rj
be B’s payoff in column j of the maximal matrix R. Since G is strictly competitive,
this will also correspond to the lowest payoff for B in column j of M. That is, rj ≤ bi,j
for all i, j. Then rt = bi,t for some i. Then rk ≤ bi,k and k dominated by d implies
bi,k ≤ bi,t. And thus rk ≤ rt. Now for any x, let ci,j,x be the i, j th entry for B in
MI(x). From the definition of MI(x), we get ci,j,x = (1− I(x))bi,j + I(x)(rj). Then for
any i, both bi,k ≤ bi,t and rk ≤ rt implies that ci,k,x ≤ ci,t,x. Thus k is dominated by d
in MI(x).
Note that if k is dominated by a mixed strategy, this argument extends in the same
way as in Proposition 4. 
Note also that strict dominance in M will imply strict dominance in MI(x).
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Proposition 7. If G is a strictly competetive game, then V(x) is nonincreasing with
respect to x.
Proof: Since V (x) = Er(x) − En(x), it is sufficient to show that Er(x) is non-
increasing and En(x) is nondecreasing. Let E
′
r be player B’s payoff when the oracle
responds, and E′n be his payoff when the oracle does not respond. G strictly compete-
tive implies that En is nondecreasing if and only if E
′
n is nonincreasing. Since R is made
from entries in G, it is also a strictly competetive game matrix, so Er is nonincreasing
if and only if E′r is nondecreasing. So it suffices to show these properties for E′r and
E′n. Note that these are both locally constant with discontinuities only at nodes since
they are based on sb. Let x
′ be any node. Lemma 2 implies that this node occurs when
a strategy becomes dominated, so let j be one such strategy, and let s be the (possibly
mixed) strategy that dominates it at x′. Then from the proof for Proposition 4 we
have rj < rs. This means that j is dominated in the matrix R. Then, when player B
shifts some of his mixed strategy probability from strategy j to strategy s as x passes
x′, E′r will increase. Thus at every node, E′r must increase, and since it is constant on
intervals between nodes, we conclude that E′r is nondecreasing.
Since E′n is also constant except at the nodes, the only place where it could possibly
increase would be at a node. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that E′n increases
at the node x′. Let s1 be player B’s strategy before the node, and s2 be player B’s
strategy after the node. For any value of I, we have
Eb(sb) = I · E′r(sb) + (1− I)E′n(sb).
Then En increasing at x
′ implies E′n(s2) > E′n(s1). We also showed above that
E′r(s2) > E′r(s1). Both of these mean that for any value of I, Eb(s2) > Eb(s1), which
means s2 will always yield a higher payoff to player B than s1, assuming player A
chooses sa optimally, regardless of how often the oracle responds. This contradicts the
assumption that s1 was part of an equilibrium before the node, since player B could
achieve a higher payoff by switching to s2 immediately. Therefore E
′
n must be nonin-
creasing. 
Theorem 2. If MI(x) has a unique equilibrium for each x except at nodes, I is strictly
concave down, and V(x) is nonincreasing, then G|I will have a unique equilibrium.
Proof: Since we assume that each MI(x) has a unique equilibrium {sa, sb}, this
covers condition 1 of Theorem 1, except at the nodes. It suffices to show that there is
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exactly one value of x that satisfies condition 2 of Theorem 1, and if it is a node then
there is only one {sa, sb} that still meets condition 1.
We can express the change in the expected value with increasing payment x for
Player A
∂Ea
∂x
=
∂Ea
∂I
· dI
dx
− 1 = V I ′ − 1 (1)
Since I ′ is everywhere continuous and V is continuous except at nodes, the expression
will be continuous except at nodes. I nondecreasing and strictly concave down imply
I is strictly increasing, and thus I ′ ≥ 0, and is strictly decreasing. We’ve previously
shown V ≥ 0, and is nonincreasing. These together imply ∂Ea∂x is strictly decreasing.
For any x, {sa(x), sb(x)} satisfy the first condition in Theorem 1, by definition. We
now demonstrate that there is exactly one value of x that satisfies either Lemma 1 or
the second condition of Theorem 1:
Case 1: ∂Ea∂x (0) < 0.
This satisfies Lemma 1, and ∂Ea∂x strictly decreasing means it is negative for all x,
so there are no values of x that satisfy V I ′ = 1, which means that {sa(0), sb(0), 0} will
be the unique equilibrium of G|I.
Case 2: There exists a c such that ∂Ea∂x (c) = 0.
Then {sa(c), sb(c), c} satisfies Theorem 1, and is an equilibrium for G|I. Since ∂Ea∂x
is strictly decreasing, then for any x < c we get ∂Ea∂x > 0, and for any x > c,
∂Ea
∂x < 0
so this equilibrium is unique.
Case 3: ∂Ea∂x (x) changes from positive to negative discontinuously at node z.
Let s1 = sb(c1) where c1 is any value in the region immediately below z, and let
s2 = sb(c2) where c2 is any value in the region immediately above z. Using Eq. 1, we
have V (s1) <
1
I′ , and V (s2) >
1
I′ , so there exists p ∈ (0, 1) such that
pV (s1) + (1− p)V (s2) = 1
I ′
Let β = ps1 +(1−p)s2. Since V is linear, this implies V (β) = 1I′ , and thus V (β)I ′ = 1.
Since some strategy gets dominated at z, we have supp(s2) ⊂ supp(s1), and thus
supp(β) = supp(s1).
Now let α = limx→z− sa(x), the strategy approached by Player A as x approaches
node z from below. Since sa(x) in this region make B indifferent on all strategies in
supp(s1) in MI(x), then α will also make B indifferent on all strategies in supp(β) of
MI(z) since this is preserved by the limit. And B indifference to a strategy despite it
being weakly dominated can only occur when one of A’s strategies goes to probability
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0 at z. In particular, supp(α) = supp(sa(c2)) ⊂ supp(sa(c1)). Then, since s1 makes A
indifferent on all strategies in supp(sa(c1)), and s2 makes A indifferent on all strategies
in supp(sa(c2)), then β will make A indifferent on all strategies in supp(α). Thus {α, β}
is an equilibrium of MI(z). Further, only linear combinations of s1 and s2 will make A
indifferent on supp(α), and of those, only β sets V I ′ = 1, so this equilibrium is unique.
Case 4: ∂Ea∂x > 0 for all x up until x1 such that I(x1) = 1
This satisfies Lemma 1. Additionally, for any x < x1 we have
∂Ea
∂x > 0 in which case A
could profit from increasing x. Thus {sa(x1), sb(x1), x1} will be the unique equilibrium
of G|I, and there is no reason that Player A would ever pay more than x1.
Finally, we note that since V is continuous everywhere except at the nodes, posi-
tive, and weakly decreasing, when combined with I ′(x) strictly decreasing, implies that
∂Ea
∂x is continuous everywhere except at nodes, and strictly decreasing. Thus exactly
one of these cases must occur, depending on if and where ∂Ea∂x changes from positive to
negative. 
5 Harmful Information
In most games we have considered so far, lower cost oracle functions (ones with greater
I(x)) cause A’s payoffs to increase when compared to more expensive ones. However,
this is not always the case. We now consider a particular game matrix where cheaper
information can be harmful to player A (in terms of decreasing his payoff in the equi-
librium). Let G be the game given by the payoff matrix M :
1 2 B1 B2 B3
A1 4,−1 0, 2 0, 0
A2 0, 2 4,−1 0, 0
This essentially is a weighted matching pennies game where player B has the option
to avoid playing altogether (opt out) by choosing strategy B3. In this classic normal
form, the only Nash equilibrium is when A plays (12 ,
1
2) and B plays (
1
2 ,
1
2 , 0), with
expected values EA = 2 and EB =
1
2 . Player B will not choose strategy 3 because she
can gain a nonzero amount of points by playing the mixed strategy.
If we consider the same strategies and payoffs but in a sequential game where B
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has to choose first, this is equivalent to giving A complete information about what B
chooses (such as an oracle with the constant function I(x) = 1). If we look at the tree
this creates:
A1 A2
B1
A1 A2
B2
A1 A2
B3
B
AA
(4,−1) (0, 2) (0, 2) (4,−1) (0, 0) (0, 0)
Figure 7: Harmful Information Extensive form game
If B ever chooses B1 or B2, A will choose the best response and the payoff will be
(4,−1). Knowing this, player B will only ever choose B3, and both players will get a
payoff of 0. Note that this is worse for both players than the mixed strategy was. That
is, player A knowing what strategy player B has played is actually detrimental to both
players. If it were possible, player A would prefer not to have that information, or to be
able to commit to ignoring the information and play a mixed strategy anyway, so as to
incentivize player B to playing B1 or B2. The information however cannot be “unseen”.
How is this reflected in the Oracle Game G|I? If A is given access to oracle I(x),
the payoff matrix MI(x) becomes:
1 2 B1 B2 B3
A1 4,−1 4I, 2− 3I 0, 0
A2 4I, 2− 3I 4,−1 0, 0
The equilibrium will occur in one of the following cases:
Case 1: If I ′(0) ≤ 12 the oracle is too expensive to be worth paying, and the equi-
librium is {(12 , 12), (12 , 12 , 0), 0} with expected values Ea = 2 and Eb = 12
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Figure 8: Expected payoff Ea as a function of k for the oracle response function I =√
kx.
Case 2 (interval): If I ′(0) ≥ 12 ≥ I ′(x 13 ) the equilibrium is {(
1
2 ,
1
2), (
1
2 ,
1
2 , 0), y 12
}, and
neither player adjusts strategies due to the symmetry between strategy 1 and 2. Then
A’s expected value is Ea = 2 + 2I(y 1
3
) − y 1
2
. Note that since A is deliberately trying
to maximize this, he’s only paying the oracle when the function has steepness at least
2, so this payoff is greater* than his payoff in case 1 (*if the oracle is a straight line of
slope 12 it will be equal). Player B’s payoff is EB =
1
2 − 32I(y 32 ), which is worse than
his payoff in Case 1, but still more than 0.
Case 3 (node): If 12 ≤ I ′(x 13 ) the equilibrium is {(
1
2 ,
1
2), (
1
4I′ ,
1
4I′ ,
4I′−2
4I′ ), x 13
}. When
I reaches 13 , B becomes indifferent between all three strategies, since her expected value
from any of them is 0, so she would be willing to play any mixed strategy involving
them. But the only equilibrium is one where A is indifferent between A1 and A2 and
also indifferent on increasing x any further. B’s strategy in the equilibrium is the only
one that satisfies both conditions. In this equilibrium, Player B’s expected value is
Eb = 0, while Player A’s is Ea =
4
3I′ − x 13 . Note that Ea > 0 because I is concave
down and must have slope at least 12 in order to get to case 3, so x 13
will be small.
However Ea is decreasing with respect to I
′(x 1
3
). The reason for this is because A gets
more payoff the more often B plays strategies 1 and 2, but as I ′(x 1
3
) increases, player
B will opt out (strategy 3) more often in order to satisfy the condition V I ′ = 1. As
I ′(x 1
3
) approaches infinity, B’s strategy will approach (0, 0, 1), causing Ea to approach 0.
Thus, A will benefit the most at the boundary between case 2 and case 3. Fig-
ure 8 shows how her expected payoff changes as information becomes cheaper (as k
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increases). If the oracle is very expensive she will have to lose most of her benefit from
the information to the oracle’s cost. But if information is too cheap then player B will
be dissuaded from playing B1 and B2, and A will receive a lower payoff than if the
oracle did not exist in the first place. Similar to the sequential game, player A having
cheap access to too much information decreases her expected value because player B
will play the safer strategy to avoid getting exploited. However because the Oracle
Game provides a continuum of information to be purchased, our model demonstrates
that having access to small amounts of information is beneficial to player A, while it
is only when a certain threshold is reached that the information become harmful, by
incentivizing player B to change strategies (as shown in Fig. 8).
6 Multiple Equilibria
Although so far we have restricted our focus to games with one mixed equilibrium,
games with multiple equilibria will tend to behave in a similar way: each equilibrium
can be analyzed separately using the same techniques. Consider the game defined by:
1 2 B1 B2 B3 B4
A1 1,−1 0, 0 −10,−10 −10,−10
A2 0, 0 2,−2 −10,−10 −10,−10
A3 −10,−10 −10,−10 2,−2 0, 0
A4 −10,−10 −10,−10 0, 0 3,−3
With no oracle, this game has three mixed strategy equilibria: one where they
play their first two strategies, one where they play their last two strategies, and one
where both players play all four strategies. If an oracle is introduced with oracle
function I(x), there will still be three mixed strategy equilibria: two corresponding to
the equilibria induced by the submatrix with either the first two strategies or the last
two strategies of both players, and one involving both sets. In this last case, some
strategies might not be included, for instance if the oracle is cheap enough that B2
or B4 become dominated. The two equilibria corresponding to smaller submatrices
will be identical to the equilibrium in a game that was just that matrix with oracle
function I(x). Thus, most of our results can be adapted and applied separately to each
individual equilibrium in larger games.
26
7 Conclusion
The Oracle Games defined here provide a method for investigating how players pay to
acquire information, as well as how players respond to information about them being
acquired. The probabilistic correction information in our model allows for detailed
analysis, including the marginal increase in expected payoff which we call the value
of information. We have shown that distinct transitions occur at nodes, where one
of player B’s strategies becomes dominated or undominated, and that these nodes are
important in considering which strategies will be played and how much information
should be purchased.
The oracle is a stand-in for any process which might or might not succeed in pro-
viding noise-free information about a player’s action. There is no fake information in
our model - when the oracle does not return information, the player knows that it has
failed. This approach could provide insight into competition between decision-makers,
who are not aware of each other’s strategies but can invest time or resources to attempt
to attain them at some cost (and risk of failure). In general, our model may be most
useful whenever information is difficult to acquire, but is always reliable once acquired.
For example, a firm hiring spies to steal files from their competitors will have to pay
regardless of whether they succeed in their operations or not, but if they succeed the
files would be unlikely to contain false information.
Although the model by Solan and Yariv (2004) is similar to ours, it gives different
results about what sorts of equilibria occur. They find that if sufficiently reliable
information can be purchased cheaply enough, the player will purchase it and act on
it as if it were completely true. They also show that the information cost affects the
game’s equilibria only insofar as it determines whether information is purchased or not;
the actual amount of information purchased, if any, depends only on the payoffs in the
original game. In our model, a player will purchase more information as it becomes
cheaper in a continuous way, until the point where a node is reached. And the shape
and values taken by I(x) can play a significant role.
Oracle Games are fundamentally asymmetric because only one player has access to
the oracle and its information. There is no straightforward way to directly extend this
to a symmetric system where both players have an oracle, since one player must commit
to a decision before the oracle can know his action and provide it to the other player.
More complicated constructions could potentially resolve this, such as having both
players bid payments for the oracle, and only the player with the higher bid gets access
to the information. Alternatively, an extended game could be played with both players
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having multiple actions, and each player could pay the oracle to learn information
about the other player’s earlier actions. These modifications, or other similar ideas,
could lead to symmetric games which would likely share many equilibrium features of
our asymmetric approach.
Finally, using randomly supplied accurate information instead of noisy signals could
be investigated in other games with information acquisition. This could simplify the
analysis by eliminating the need for players to condition their actions on uncertain be-
liefs, while still retaining the incentive to increase the amount of information available.
Acknowledgement
We thank Glenn Young for insightful discussions and helpful comments. This work was
supported in part by National Science Foundation Grant CMMI-1463482.
References
Alberto Antonioni, Maria Paula Cacault, Rafael Lalive, and Marco Tomassini. Know
thy neighbor: Costly information can hurt cooperation in dynamic networks. PloS
One, 9(10):e110788, 2014. doi: https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0110788.
Kenta Asahina, Viktoryia Pavlenkovich, and Leslie B Vosshall. The survival advantage
of olfaction in a competitive environment. Current Biology, 18(15):1153–1155, 2008.
doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2008.06.075.
Elchanan Ben-Porath and Michael Kahneman. Communication in repeated games
with costly monitoring. Games and Economic Behavior, 44(2):227–250, 2003. doi:
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00022-8.
P.-A. Chiappori, S. Levitt, and T. Groseclose. Testing mixed-strategy equilibria when
players are heterogeneous: The case of penalty kicks in soccer. American Economic
Review, 92:1138–1151, 2002.
Kfir Eliaz and Andrew Schotter. Paying for confidence: An experimental study of the
demand for non-instrumental information. Games and Economic Behavior, 70(2):
304–324, 2010. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.01.006.
Ja´nos Flesch and Andre´s Perea. Repeated games with voluntary information purchase.
Games and Economic Behavior, 66(1):126–145, 2009. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/
j.geb.2008.04.015.
28
Xavier Gabaix, David Laibson, Guillermo Moloche, and Stephen Weinberg. Costly in-
formation acquisition: Experimental analysis of a boundedly rational model. Amer-
ican Economic Review, 96(4):1043–1068, 2006. doi: https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.96.
4.1043.
Julio Gonza´lez-Daz, Ignacio Garca-Jurado, and M. Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro. An in-
troductory course on mathematical game theory. American Mathematical Society,
2010.
Joseph Y. Halpern and Rafael Pass. Game theory with translucent players. Interna-
tional Journal of Game Theory, 47(3):949–976, 2018. doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/
s00182-018-0626-x.
John C. Harsanyi. Games with incomplete information played by “Bayesian” players,
i–iii: Part i. the basic model. Management Science, 14(3):159–182, 1967. doi: https:
//doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.14.3.159.
Christian Hellwig and Laura Veldkamp. Knowing what others know: Coordination
motives in information acquisition. The Review of Economic Studies, 76(1):223–251,
2009. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937X.2008.00515.x.
Youxin Hu, John Kagel, Huanxing Yang, and Lan Zhang. The effects of pre-play
communication in a coordination game with incomplete information. SSRN, 2018.
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3156442.
Ce´sar Martinelli. Rational ignorance and voting behavior. International Journal of
Game Theory, 35(3):315–335, 2007.
John McDonald. Strategy in poker, business and war. WW Norton and Company,
1996.
Jeanine Miklo´s-Thal and Heiner Schumacher. The value of recommendations. Games
and Economic Behavior, 79:132–147, 2013. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.
01.005.
Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin. Social value of public information. Amer-
ican Economic Review, 92(5):1521–1534, 2002. doi: https://doi.org/10.1257/
000282802762024610.
David P Myatt and Chris Wallace. Endogenous information acquisition in coordination
games. The Review of Economic Studies, 79(1):340–374, 2012. doi: https://doi.org/
10.1093/restud/rdr018.
29
David P Myatt and Chris Wallace. Cournot competition and the social value of infor-
mation. Journal of Economic Theory, 158:466–506, 2015. doi: https://doi.org/10.
1016/j.jet.2014.07.011.
Philip J. Reny and Arthur J. Robson. Reinterpreting mixed strategy equilibria: a
unification of the classical and Bayesian views. Games and Economic Behavior, 48:
355–384, 2004. doi: https://doi:10.1016/j.geb.2003.09.009.
Alexandros Rigos. Flexible information acquisition in large coordination games.
Preprint at https://swopec.hhs.se/lunewp/abs/lunewp2018 030.htm, 2018.
Diego Ruiz-Herna´ndez, Javier Elizalde, and David Delgado-Go´mez. Cournot–
Stackelberg games in competitive delocation. Annals of Operations Research, 256
(1):149–170, 2017. doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-016-2288-z.
Yasuhiro Sakai. Cournot and Bertrand equilibria under imperfect information. Journal
of Economics, 46(3):213–232, 1986. doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01229301.
Eilon Solan and Leeat Yariv. Games with espionage. Games and Economic Behavior,
47(1):172–199, 2004. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00177-5.
Michal Szkup and Isabel Trevino. Information acquisition in global games of regime
change. Journal of Economic Theory, 160:387–428, 2015. doi: https://doi.org/10.
1016/j.jet.2015.10.005.
Ming Yang. Coordination with flexible information acquisition. Journal of Economic
Theory, 158:721–738, 2015.
Notes
1Since I(x) is weakly concave down, I ′(x) may be constant and equal to b on some interval. If so,
then yb can refer to any one of the values on that interval, and any statement we make about yb is
true for all such values. When this occurs in a Nash Equilibrium, the Oracle Game will have multiple
equilibria, one for each choice of yc
30
